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Abstract 
 
The approach/avoidance effect refers to the finding that valenced stimuli trigger approach and 
avoidance actions. Markman and Brendl (2005) argued that this effect is not a truly embodied 
phenomenon, but depends on participants’ symbolic representation of the self.  
In their study, participants moved valenced words toward or away from their own name on 
the computer screen. This would induce participants to form a ‘disembodied’ self-
representation at the location of their name, outside of the body. Approach/avoidance effects 
occurred with respect to the participant’s name, rather than with respect to the body. 
In three experiments, we demonstrate that similar effects are found when the name is replaced 
by a positive word, a negative word or even when no word is presented at all. This suggests 
that the ‘disembodied self’ explanation of Markman and Brendl is incorrect, and that their 
findings do not necessarily constrain embodied theories of cognition. 
 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
Unconstraining Embodied Cognition 3 
Unconstraining Theories of Embodied Cognition 
 
Many studies have demonstrated that positive and negative words automatically 
trigger approach or avoidance actions (e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1999; Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004; 
Solarz, 1960; Wentura, Rothermund, & Bak, 2000). This phenomenon, called the 
approach/avoidance effect, has been brought forward as an example of embodied cognition 
(e.g., Niedenthal et al., 2005). It shows that cognitive processing involves the activation of the 
sensorimotor system. In studies of this phenomenon, participants typically respond to 
valenced words by making an arm movement toward or away from the word. For example, in 
the study by Chen and Bargh (1999), participants categorized positive and negative words by 
pulling a joystick toward themselves or pushing it away. In response to positive words, 
participants were faster to pull the joystick than to push it away. In response to negative 
words, in contrast, they were faster to push the joystick away than to pull it toward 
themselves. Based on these findings, Chen and Bargh concluded that valenced words are 
evaluated automatically. This automatic evaluation involves the activation of particular arm 
movements that are associated with approach and avoidance. They defined arm flexion as an 
approach reaction (pulling a positive stimulus toward oneself) and arm extension as an 
avoidance reaction (pushing a negative stimulus away).  
However, other studies have shown that arm movements cannot be unambiguously 
connected to approach or avoidance. Arm flexion can also be associated with withdrawing 
from an aversive stimulus (avoidance), and arm extension can be interpreted as reaching for a 
desired stimulus (e.g., Seibt, Neumann, Nussinson, & Strack, 2008). Approach and avoidance 
effects have even been found when participants do not move their arms with respect to the 
stimulus, but instead make button presses that result in an apparent movement of the stimulus 
toward or away from the participant (van Dantzig, Pecher, & Zwaan, 2008). 
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To resolve the ambiguity, Markman and Brendl (2005) suggested that it is not the 
direction of motion as such that defines whether a movement is associated with approach or 
avoidance, but rather the direction of motion with respect to the self. Usually, the self is 
represented as located within the body. The location of the self in space is therefore 
confounded with that of the body. Markman and Brendl tried to deconfound the 
representations of self and body. In their study, participants viewed a computer screen 
displaying a corridor, which produced an illusion of depth. The participant’s name 
(representing the self) was presented in the center of the corridor, and emotionally valenced 
words appeared either in front of the name or behind the name, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
Participants responded to the words by moving a joystick backward or forward. Participants 
who received the positive toward instruction were told to move positive words toward their 
own name and to move negative words away from it. Conversely, participants in the negative 
toward condition were instructed to move negative words toward their own name and positive 
words away from it. Depending on the location of the word (behind or in front of the 
participant’s name), moving the word toward the name could imply a pulling motion or a 
pushing motion. Moving the word away from the name could also require either pulling or 
pushing, depending on whether the word appeared in front of the name or behind it.  
Markman and Brendl reasoned that if evaluative movements are made with respect to 
the representation of the self rather than to the body, participants in the positive toward 
condition should be faster than participants in the negative toward condition, regardless of the 
direction of bodily motion. Their results confirmed this hypothesis. Participants were faster to 
move positive words toward their name (the representation of the self) and negative words 
away from their name, irrespective of whether that implied a pulling or a pushing motion. 
Similar findings were obtained in a study by Brendl, Markman and Messner (2005). In this 
study, target words were presented to the left and right of the participant’s name, and 
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participants moved a joystick sideways to move the words toward or away from their name. 
Again, response times were faster when participants moved positive words toward their name 
and negative words away from their name. Based on their findings, Markman and Brendl 
(2005) concluded that the connection between stimulus evaluation and bodily action is not 
direct, but mediated by abstract representations of approach and avoidance behavior and the 
self. Building further upon this conclusion, they argued that a purely embodied account of 
cognition is insufficient to explain all of cognition. In addition to perceptual and motor 
representations, embodied theories of cognition must also include more abstract or symbolic 
representations. In other words, they suggest that their findings constrain theories of 
embodied cognition. 
However, this argument hinges on the assumption that the phenomenon studied in 
their experiment is a true instance of the approach/avoidance effect. This assumption is 
debatable, for a number of reasons. First, Markman and Brendl (2005) suppose that their 
participants form a representation of the self at the location of their own name on the screen. 
One could, however, wonder if the manipulation of merely presenting the participant’s name 
on the computer screen is sufficient to trigger participants to form such a disembodied self 
representation. 
Second, if one assumes that participants do indeed form some kind of disembodied 
representation of the self, one would expect this representation to be weaker than a 
representation of the self located within the body. After all, people typically represent the self 
as integrated within the body. The body is therefore the default location of the self. As a 
consequence, approach/avoidance effects with respect to a disembodied self on the computer 
screen should be smaller than approach/avoidance effects with respect to the ‘self-within-
body’. After all, it is very unlikely that people would show stronger approach or avoidance 
reactions toward a non-physical representation of the self than to their own body. In 
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experiments studying the approach/avoidance effect with regard to the body, the effect sizes 
(2)  typically lie in the range of .08 to .23 (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004; 
Wentura et al., 2000). Instead of being smaller than these numbers, the effect size in 
Markman and Brendl’s experiment is .41, almost twice as large as the largest of the effect 
sizes observed in body-related approach/avoidance studies1. This observation suggests that 
the results of their study may not reflect a true approach/avoidance effect, but rather that they 
are (at least partially) caused by a different process. 
A possible candidate for such a different process is categorization. In Markman and 
Brendl’s (2005) experiment, participants classified words into a positive or a negative 
category, by moving the words with respect to their name. Participants may have used their 
name as a category label, referring to the category of words that had to be moved toward it. 
Thus, for participants who moved positive words toward their own name, their name 
represented the positive category. On the other hand, for participants who moved negative 
words toward their own name, their name denoted the negative category. It is quite likely that 
the latter group of participants had trouble using their name as a negative category label, 
because one’s own name typically has a strong positive value. This is demonstrated, for 
example, by the name-letter effect (e.g., Koole, Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2001), 
which refers to the finding that people like the letters (especially the initials) of their own 
name better than other letters of the alphabet. The name-letter effect correlates with measures 
of self-esteem. The positive bias of the own name thus appears to reflect the fact that most 
people have quite a favourable view of themselves (e.g., Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Koole 
et al., 2001).  
If participants consider the Markman and Brendl task as a categorization task, using 
their names as category labels, we expect them to perform this categorization task more easily 
when the valence of the category label (the participant’s name) matches the items that have to 
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be sorted within that category (positive words) than when the category label mismatches the 
category members (negative words). This prediction is in line with the findings of Markman 
and Brendl (2005). In addition, the categorization hypothesis also predicts that a similar 
congruency effect should be obtained when the participant’s name is replaced by another 
strongly positive word. Conversely, if the name is replaced by a negative word, the opposite 
effect should be found. Participants should be slower to move positive words toward the 
negative word, and faster to move negative words toward it. These predictions were tested in 
the current study, in which we followed the procedure of Markman and Brendl, but either 
replaced the participant’s name with the strongly positive word ‘Love’ (Experiment 1) or the 
strongly negative word ‘Hate’ (Experiment 2). When the word ‘Love’ was used instead of the 
name, we expected the same pattern of results as in the Markman and Brendl study. When the 
word ‘Hate’ was used, we expected to find the opposite pattern of results. 
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-seven students from the Erasmus University Rotterdam 
participated in the experiment, in return for course credit or a small monetary fee ( 5,-). One 
participant, with an error rate higher than 30%, was excluded from the analysis. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the two instructions. 
Stimulus Materials and Apparatus. Thirty-two positive and thirty-two negative words 
were selected from a normed list. The words on this list had been rated on a 7-point scale (1 = 
extremely negative, 7 = extremely positive) by 29 participants. Word frequencies of the 
selected words were retrieved from the CELEX database (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & van Rijn, 
1993). The positive central word ‘Liefde’ (Love) received a valence rating of 6.4 and has a 
log frequency of 2.23 per million. The negative target words had an average valence rating of 
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2.0 (SD = 0.23) and a log frequency of 1.06 per million (SD = 0.41). The positive target words 
had an average valence rating of 6.0 (SD = 0.29) and a frequency of 1.27 per million (SD = 
0.45). Most of the words were nouns (42 words), the others were adjectives (8 words) and 
verbs (14 words). The complete stimulus list is provided in the Appendix. In addition to the 
target stimuli, a set of comparable, but slightly less extremely valenced words were selected 
to function as practice and warm-up trials1.  
Words were presented on a 22-inch computer screen, with a resolution of 1248 by 
1024 pixels, using E-Prime stimulus presentation software (Schneider, Eschman, & 
Zuccolotto, 2002). 
Participants were instructed to ‘move’ the target words toward or away from the 
central word (which was presented in a rectangular box) by making a mouse movement 2. The 
mouse speed was set at a low value, such that a response required a considerable movement 
of the mouse (approximately 10 cm in forward or backward direction). The mouse 
acceleration rate was set to zero, such that the cursor’s position on the screen was linearly 
related to the position of the mouse on the table. The cursor remained invisible to the 
participants. It was placed in the middle of the screen at the start of each trial, and its position 
was continuously tracked during the participant’s response. Prior to the experiment, a pilot 
study was run to verify that the original findings of Markman and Brendl (2005) could be 
replicated with our slightly altered design and Dutch stimulus set. The design and results of 
this pilot study are described in more detail in Footnote 3. Despite the methodological 
differences, the results of Markman and Brendl’s original study were replicated in our pilot 
study. 
 
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions. 
Participants in the Positive toward condition were instructed to move positive words toward 
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the central word ‘Love’ and negative words away from it. Participants in the Negative toward 
condition were instructed to move positive words away from the central word ‘Love’, and 
negative words toward it.  
Participants sat at a distance of approximately fifty centimetres from the computer 
screen, and held the mouse with their preferred hand. The central word ‘Love’ was presented 
on a rectangular block in the middle of the screen for the duration of the experiment. 
Participants initiated each trial by placing the mouse on a black cross drawn on the 
tabletop (approximately twenty-five centimetres from the table’s edge), and clicking the left 
mouse button. After an interval of 50 ms a target word appeared either in front of the central 
word or behind it. Participants responded to the valence of the target word by pushing the 
mouse forward or pulling it backward. The target word remained on the screen until the 
cursor had reached the upper or lower border of the screen or until 4000 ms had passed.    
The experiment started with two practice blocks, followed by four experimental 
blocks. The first practice block used the words ‘goed’ (‘good’) and ‘slecht’ (‘bad’). The 
second practice block used various emotionally valenced words, similar to the words used in 
the experimental blocks. During the practice blocks, participants received feedback after each 
trial. During the experimental blocks, no immediate feedback was given anymore. Instead, 
after each block, subjects received feedback on their average accuracy during that block. They 
were complimented when accuracy was higher than 97 % and urged to be more accurate when 
accuracy was below 90 %. Each block started with two warm-up trials, followed by thirty-two 
experimental trials. Each target word was presented twice, once in each position.  
 
Results 
We expected that the motion-congruency effect should be primarily found in the 
response initiation time, because this measure is thought to reflect central processes such as 
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stimulus evaluation, response selection and motor planning (Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004). Other 
measures, such as movement time, were not expected to be affected by the experimental 
conditions. Movement time is considered to be relatively independent of the response 
initiation time, and is affected more by physical characteristics of the response such as the 
distance and speed of the mouse movement. 
The response initiation time was defined as the time at which the cursor had been 
moved 50 pixels from its starting point in vertical direction. This measure combined a high 
sensitivity to true responses with a low responsiveness to small random mouse movements. 
Responses that were incorrect, slower than 2500 ms or faster than 200 ms were removed from 
the analysis. In addition, response times more than 2 standard deviations from the subject 
mean were considered outliers and filtered out. In total, 4.6 % of the data were excluded 
because of errors and 8.0 % were removed because of outlying reaction times. The average 
response times per condition are presented in Table 1. Data were analyzed by subject and by 
item, using an independent samples t-test with Instruction (Positive toward vs. Negative 
toward) as between-participant factor. 
As predicted, participants in the Positive toward condition responded faster (M = 863 
ms) than those in the Negative toward condition (M = 986 ms). This effect was significant 
both in the subject analysis, t1(34) = 2.51, p < .05, Cohen’s d = .86, and in the item analysis, 
t2(63) = 18.06, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.24. 
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 tested the hypothesis that participants perform the task more easily when 
the valence of the central word matches the items that have to be moved toward the central 
word. Thus, when the central word is a negative word (i.e., Hate), participants are expected to 
be slower in the Positive toward condition than in the Negative toward condition (i.e., the 
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opposite pattern of Experiment 1 is predicted). 
 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-six students from the Erasmus University Rotterdam participated 
in the experiment, in return for course credit or a small monetary fee ( 5,-). 
Materials and Procedure. Experiment 2 followed the same procedure as Experiment 
1, but the central word ‘Hate’ was used instead of ‘Love’. This word has a valence rating of 
1.52 and a log frequency of 1.57 per million. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two instructions. Those in the 
Positive toward condition received the instruction to move positive words toward the central 
word ‘Hate’ and negative words away from it. Participants in the Negative toward condition 
were instructed to move positive words away from ‘Hate’ and negative words toward it. 
 
Results 
Responses that were incorrect, slower than 2500 ms or faster than 200 ms were 
removed from the analysis. Reaction times beyond 2 standard deviations from the subject 
mean were filtered out. In total, 6.6 % of the data were excluded because of errors and 5.9 % 
were removed because of outlying reaction times. The average response times per condition 
are presented in Table 1. Data were analyzed by subject and by item, using an independent 
samples t-test with Instruction (Positive toward vs. Negative toward) as between-participant 
factor. 
The effect of Instruction was significant: both when analyzed by subject, t1(34) = 2.60, 
p < .05, Cohen’s d = .89, and by item, t2(63) = 12.23, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.52. 
Interestingly, however, the effect was in the opposite direction of our predictions. As in 
Experiment 1, participants in the positive toward condition responded faster (M = 803) than 
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those in the negative toward condition (M = 923). 
 
Discussion 
 The categorization hypothesis predicts that the categorization of words is 
facilitated when the valence of the central word is congruent with the valence of the 
words that have to be moved toward it. Most participants regard their own name as a 
strongly positive word (reflecting a healthy positive self-image). According to the 
categorization hypothesis, they should therefore respond faster when they move positive 
words toward their name than when they move negative words toward it. The same 
pattern of results occurred when the participant’s name was replaced by another strongly 
positive word (‘Love’), as predicted by the categorization hypothesis. However, when 
the name was replaced by a negative word (‘Hate’), the opposite pattern did not emerge. 
Participants were still faster in the positive toward condition than in the negative toward 
condition. This finding is incompatible with the categorization hypothesis. Together, the 
results of Experiment 1 and 2 and the pilot experiment suggest that the valence of the 
central word is not of central importance in causing the results. Participants are always 
faster in the positive toward condition than in the negative toward condition, 
irrespective of the central word. Clearly, the presence of the participant’s name on the 
screen is also not crucial for the effect. In Experiment 3, this was investigated further by 
presenting no word in the middle of the screen (i.e., the rectangular box in the centre of 
the screen was empty). If the same pattern of results occurs as in the other experiments, 
this would indicate that the effect is likely to be the result of an artifact of the task.     
 
 
Experiment 3 
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Method 
Participants. Seventy-six students from the Erasmus University Rotterdam 
participated in the experiment, in return for course credit or a small monetary fee ( 5,-). Five 
participants were excluded because their error rate was above 30%, leaving a total of 71 
participants. 
Materials and Procedure. Experiment 3 followed the same procedure as the previous 
experiments, but an empty block was presented in the middle of the screen. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the two instructions. Those in the Positive toward condition 
received the instruction to move positive words toward the central block and negative words 
away from it. Participants in the Negative toward condition were instructed to move positive 
words away from the central block and negative words toward it. 
 
Results 
Responses that were incorrect, slower than 2500 ms or faster than 200 ms were 
removed from the analysis. In addition, response times more than 2 standard deviations from 
the subject mean were considered outliers and filtered out. In total, 5.4 % of the data were 
removed because of errors and 3.1 % were removed because of outlying reaction times. The 
average response times are presented in Table 1. Participants in the Positive toward condition 
responded faster (M = 880) than those in the Negative toward condition (M = 934). This effect 
was significant in the item analysis, t2(63) = 10.66, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.33. In the subject 
analysis, the effect was significant only when tested one-sided, t1(69) = 1.67, p < 05, Cohen’s 
d = 0.40.  
The effect of instruction was numerically smaller in this experiment than in the 
previous experiments. To investigate if this difference was significant, an overall analysis was 
performed on the data from all three experiments. The data were submitted to a 2 x 3 
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between-subjects Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with Instruction (positive toward vs. 
negative toward) and Central Word (‘Love’, ‘Hate’, no word) as variables. This analysis 
revealed a main effect of Instruction, F(1,132) = 24.26, p < .001, 2 = .10. Importantly, the 
interaction between Instruction and Central Word was not significant, F < 1, indicating that 
the size of the effect was not significantly influenced by the central word. It appears that 
participants are always faster in the Positive toward condition than in the Negative toward 
condition, regardless of what is presented in the center of the screen (positive word, negative 
word or no word).  
 
 General Discussion 
An important issue in cognitive science regards the question to which degree 
sensorimotor processes are involved in cognition. In recent years, the embodied cognition 
view is gaining momentum, which suggests that cognition is strongly intertwined with the 
systems of perception and action, using representations that are directly derived from these 
systems (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997; Pulvermüller, 1999). Proponents of this view 
often refer to the growing number of studies that demonstrate how cognition interacts with 
perception and action. These studies, applying a wide range of paradigms, have shown that 
the sensorimotor system is involved in many cognitive processes, such as conceptual 
processing (e.g., Martin, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000; Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2003; 
Solomon & Barsalou, 2004), memory (e.g., Glenberg, 1997) and language (e.g., Glenberg & 
Kaschak, 2002; Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). Based on this 
empirical evidence, it can be concluded that cognition at least partially involves the systems 
of perception and action. Clearly, cognition is not completely amodal and symbolic. However, 
the question remains whether cognition can be completely grounded in perception and action. 
In other words, can all cognitive tasks be performed with analogue, sensorimotor 
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representations, or do some cognitive tasks require more symbolic, abstract representations? 
The latter position is taken by Markman and Brendl (2005). They claim that “perceptual and 
motor representations alone may not be sufficient to account for cognitive processing, 
because phenomena that at face value seem prime examples of lower-order perceptual and 
motor processing may nonetheless involve higher-order symbolic processing” (p. 10). The 
phenomenon addressed in their study is the approach/avoidance effect; the finding that 
valenced words automatically trigger approach or avoidance reactions. According to 
Markman and Brendl, their study demonstrates that approach/avoidance actions are not 
executed with respect to the body, but with respect to a symbolic, disembodied representation 
of the ‘self’. Although the representation of the self is usually located within the body, they 
argue that it is not necessarily tied to the body. Markman and Brendl tried to separate the 
representations of the self and the body, by presenting the participant’s name on the computer 
screen. They assumed that this manipulation induced participants to form a disembodied self-
representation, located at the position of the name on the screen. As a result, they argued, 
participants demonstrated approach/avoidance effects with respect to their own name (the 
self). Participants responded faster when moving positive words toward their own name and 
negative words away from it, than when moving positive words away from their name and 
negative words toward it. Based on this finding, Markman and Brendl conclude that 
phenomena that have been put forward as prime examples of embodied processing, such as 
the approach/avoidance effect, may involve higher order symbolic representations. Theories 
of embodied cognition must specify how such higher order symbolic representations play a 
role in cognition. 
A number of objections can be posed against this line of reasoning. First, the idea that 
Markman and Brendl’s results are caused by a disembodied self-representation is undermined 
by our findings. We have demonstrated that the same results are found when the participant’s 
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name is replaced by a positive word (Experiment 1), a negative word (Experiment 2), or even 
an empty block (Experiment 3). The presence of the participant’s name on the screen is 
clearly not crucial for the results. This makes Markman and Brendl’s explanation in terms of 
approach/avoidance unlikely. The alternative categorization hypothesis has also proven to be 
incorrect by the results of Experiment 2 and 3. It is therefore more likely that the effect is due 
to another mechanism. 
A possible candidate for this mechanism may be ‘polarity correspondence’ (Proctor & 
Cho, 2006). According to the polarity correspondence hypothesis, dimensions of stimulus and 
response are asymmetric, with one pole of the dimension being more ‘salient’ or ‘marked’ 
than the other pole. Proctor and Cho (2006) use the more neutral terms + polarity and – 
polarity. For example, on the dimension of valence, positive is coded as + polarity and 
negative is coded as – polarity. Responses may also be coded asymmetrically; a Yes or True 
response is coded as + polarity, while a No or False response is coded as – polarity. The 
polarity correspondence principle can be defined in the following way:  
 
For a variety of binary classification tasks, people code the stimulus alternatives and 
the response alternatives as + polarity and – polarity, and response selection is faster 
when the polarities correspond than when they do not.  
(Proctor and Cho, 2006, p. 118) 
 
With regard to the current study, one might assume that the responses are coded 
asymmetrically, with the toward response possibly being coded as + polarity and the away 
response as – polarity. As a result, in the positive toward condition there is correspondence 
between stimulus valence and direction of the response. In the negative toward condition, 
however, polarity of the stimulus does not correspond with the polarity of the response. Due 
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to the polarity correspondence, responses in the Positive toward conditions would be faster 
than those in the Negative toward condition. It is important to note, however, that the 
assignments of polarities to the toward and away responses has not been determined 
independently, but rather is used as an ad-hoc explanation for our current findings.Although 
more research will be needed to verify this alternative explanation, our experiments have 
clearly shown that the effect cannot be explained in terms of approach/avoidance with respect 
to a disembodied self, and thus that the explanation of Markman and Brendl (2005) is 
incorrect. 
The second objection against the argumentation of Markman and Brendl (2005) 
regards the necessity of symbolic representations in explaining approach/avoidance effects. 
The original incentive of their study was the observation that approach and avoidance 
responses cannot be unambiguously associated with specific motor actions. To resolve this 
ambiguity, they proposed that approach and avoidance actions are performed with reference 
to the ‘self’, rather than to the body. However, a symbolic disembodied representation of the 
self is not necessary to account for the ambiguity found in approach/avoidance studies. It can 
also be solved by defining approach and avoidance as flexible action plans, represented in 
terms of their perceivable effects (e.g., Puca, Rinkenauer, & Breidenstein, 2006; Seibt et al., 
2008; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; van Dantzig et al., 2008). Approach and avoidance are not 
hard-wired muscular responses. They can be realized in different ways (involving either 
flexion or extension of the arm), but their effects are unambiguous. Approach actions reduce 
the distance between a stimulus and oneself, either by pulling the stimulus toward oneself 
(flexion), or by reaching for the stimulus (extension). On the other hand, avoidance actions 
increase distance between a stimulus and the self, either by withdrawing from the stimulus 
(flexion) or by pushing the stimulus away (extension).  
There is common consensus that motor control involves a hierarchical system (e.g. 
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Hamilton & Grafton, 2007; Haruno et al, 2003). Actions are represented at various levels of 
abstraction. At the highest level, actions are represented in terms of their goals or outcomes. 
At the middle level, actions are represented in terms of the movement kinematics (e.g. shape 
of the hand and the motion trajectory). At the lowest level, actions are represented in terms of 
muscle activations. This hierarchy is also found in the organization of the brain. Whereas 
some brain areas encode actions at the level of muscle activation, other areas encode the goal 
or intention of actions (e.g. Fogassi et al., 2005; Grafton & Hamilton, 2007). A similar 
hierarchy may be found in perceptual processing. Perceptual information is coded at 
increasing levels of complexity by subsequent cortical areas. The sensorimotor system thus 
processes perceptual and motor information in a hierarchical manner, with information 
becoming more and more complex and abstract as it travels upstream (cf. Damasio’s (1989) 
notion of convergence zones). Higher-level sensorimotor representations are necessary to 
enable an organism to interact flexibly with a dynamic environment. Without such 
representations, the sensorimotor system would only be able to respond in a reflex-like 
manner.  
The idea that cognition is grounded in the systems of perception and action does not 
necessarily imply that cognitive concepts are mapped directly onto very low-level 
sensorimotor representations. It is more likely that concepts are linked to the perceptual and 
motor system at a higher level of representation (e.g. the level of the action goal). Such 
higher-level representations obviously are more abstract than the low-level representations, 
but they are still firmly grounded in perception and action.  
Markman and Brendl (2005) concluded that their results “constrain theories of 
embodied cognition by suggesting that the ease of a particular movement depends crucially 
on representations of the task that go beyond simple learned motor actions” (p. 9). One could 
argue that our findings do not oppose their conclusion but rather confirm it. As becomes 
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apparent in our experiments, embodiment effects such as the approach/avoidance effect are 
easily overridden by manipulations of rather arbitrary aspects of the task (e.g., a word or 
empty block presented in the center of the computer screen). We agree that higher-level 
representations may be necessary to explain how such arbitrary task characteristics influence 
the speed of response selection and execution. However, we do not agree that these higher-
level representations are completely symbolic and disembodied. By means of their 
hierarchical connections to lower-level representations, they may still be embodied and 
grounded in the sensorimotor system.   
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Footnotes 
 
1. In Markman and Brendl’s (2005) experiment, the proportional difference in reaction times 
between the congruent and incongruent condition was .33. This is much higher than the 
proportional differences found in other studies (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Rotteveel & Phaf ,2004; 
Wentura et al., 2000), which lie in the range of .01 to .15. 
 
2.
 As in the original Markman and Brendl experiment, the words on the screen did not actually 
move. 
 
3.
 Prior to the experiment, a pilot study was run to verify that the original findings of 
Markman and Brendl (2005) could be replicated with our slightly altered design and Dutch 
stimulus set. The pilot study largely followed their original procedure, with a few 
modifications. Thirty-eight students from the Erasmus University Rotterdam participated in 
return for course credits. The participant’s name was presented in the middle of the corridor. 
On every trial, an emotionally valenced word was presented in front of or behind the 
participant’s name. Participants were instructed to judge the valence of the target word by 
making a mouse movement. Half of the participants received the Positive toward instruction. 
They had to move positive words toward their name and negative words away from their 
name. The other half of the participants received the Negative toward instruction. They had to 
move positive words away from their name and negative words toward their name. The data 
were analyzed using a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), with Word 
Valence (positive vs. negative) and Word Position (in front of name vs. behind name) as 
within-participant factors and Instruction (congruent vs. incongruent) as between-participant 
factor. There was a main effect of Instruction, F(1, 36) = 7.71, p <.01, η2 = .17. Participants 
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were faster to respond to stimuli in the positive toward condition (M = 820 ms, SE = 38.2) 
than in the negative toward condition (M = 962 ms, SE = 33.2). This pattern was true for all 
valence-position combinations, as confirmed by separate t-tests (p-values ranged between 
.008 and .027). No interaction effects were found. There were no main effects or interaction 
effects for the error scores. The results from the pilot study indicate that the modifications of 
our design did not affect the main outcomes of the experiment. This cleared the way for our 
actual manipulation of replacing the participants name with a strongly positive or negative 
word. 
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Table 1 
Mean Response Times (in Milliseconds) and Error Rates (in Percentages) as a Function of 
Instruction for Experiment 1 (‘Love’),  Experiment 2 (‘Hate’) and Experiment 3 (no word). 
Standard Errors are within Brackets. 
 Response Time (ms)  Error Rate (%) 
Central Word Positive Toward Negative Toward  Positive Toward Negative Toward 
‘Love’ 863 (31.4) 986 (38.0)  3.8 (1.30) 5.3 (1.14) 
‘Hate’ 803 (16.1) 923 (43.5)  5.7 (.98) 8.0 (1.55) 
No word 857 (21.5) 915 (27.7)  4.6 (.99) 5.5 (.93) 
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Figure 1. Display as used in Markman and Brendl (2005) study and the pilot experiment in 
the present study. 
 
(Figure added in separate file) 
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Appendix 
Positive items Negative items 
Dutch English Valence Log Freq Dutch English Valence Log Freq 
beloning reward 5.59 1.28 agressie aggression 1.76 1.30 
briljant brilliant 6.07 0.60 bedrog deceit 2.03 1.11 
cadeau present 5.48 1.11 beroerd miserable 2.04 0.85 
creatief creative 6.17 0.95 crisis crisis 2.07 1.54 
engel angel 6.07 1.18 dode dead person 1.97 1.36 
feest party 6.07 1.60 duivel devil 1.86 1.57 
geluk happiness 6.41 2.02 dwang coercion 1.97 1.08 
geschenk gift 5.69 1.04 falen to fail 2.28 0.78 
gezond healthy 6.24 1.62 fataal fatal 1.69 0.60 
hemels heavenly 6.17 0.30 gevangen imprisoned 2.10 1.34 
hoop hope 5.93 1.92 kanker cancer 1.41 1.26 
humor humor 6.31 1.23 klagen to complain 2.17 0.85 
ideaal ideal 6.14 1.46 kwaal disease 2.10 0.95 
kameraad comrade 6.1 1.28 kwellen to harass 1.86 0.30 
lach laughter 6.31 1.57 kwetsen to hurt 2.00 0.48 
makker buddy 5.76 0.60 monster monster 2.38 1.18 
paradijs paradise 6.45 1.26 moord murder 1.41 1.58 
plezier pleasure 6.07 1.80 oorlog war 1.52 2.29 
pret fun 5.9 0.90 ramp disaster 1.79 1.28 
prima fine 5.86 1.28 ruzie fight 2.00 1.54 
strelen to caress 5.86 0.70 schelden to curse 2.14 0.48 
succes success 6.03 1.93 schoft villain 2.00 0.85 
triomf triumph 5.69 1.04 stikken to choke 1.97 0.48 
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trouw faithful 6.03 1.42 tragisch tragic 2.14 0.85 
vreugde gladness 6.43 1.61 triest sad 1.97 0.95 
vriend friend 6.52 2.16 verraad treachery 1.86 1.11 
welkom welcome 5.62 1.30 verrot rotten 2.10 0.00 
wijsheid wisdom 6.28 1.40 vijandig hostile 2.03 0.90 
winst profit 5.52 1.58 wanhoop despair 1.72 1.36 
zalig blissful 5.9 0.78 wraak revenge 2.24 1.26 
zoen kiss 5.86 0.90 zeuren to whine 2.21 0.48 
zonnig sunny 6.38 0.78 ziekte illness 1.76 1.94 
 average 6.03 1.27  average 1.95 1.06 
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